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The Individual-level Implications of Social Capital for  
Democracy in East Asia*
Kwang-Il Yoon
This paper attempts to explore the implications of social capital in East Asia for the citizens’ 
attitudes toward political engagement and the quality of governance using the fourth wave of the Asian 
Barometer Survey. Using multilevel analysis, it attempts to disentangle individual level and country 
level factors in explaining generalized trust and other political involvement variables. In doing so, 
it aims to enrich the theory of social capital based on the experience and evidence from East Asia. 
The analysis finds that formal membership tends to decrease generalized trust, which independently 
increases political involvement. It also finds that Confucianism at the country level tends to dampen 
political engagement. It suggests that most formal group in this region might be characterized as 
bonding and the citizens in Confucian culture might still be characterized as allegiant rather than 
assertive citizens.
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1. CIVIC CULTURE, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND DEMOCRACY
What makes political regimes and democracy in particular stable? This is one of the 
most important questions that empirically minded students of political culture have tackled 
with since Almond and Verba’s seminal study (1963). Based on comparative surveys from 
five nations, it concludes the civic culture, a mixture of more traditional cultures such as 
subject and parochial ones with more modern, rational, participatory culture, is “particularly 
appropriate for” and “most congruent with” democratic political system.1 Eckstein concurs 
and elaborates on this “congruence theory.” He expects that government performance will 
be enhanced if its authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of society. 
Moreover, he advocates “balanced disparities” or combinations of democratic and non-
democratic traits as a condition for effective democracy (Eckstein, 1969). In fact, Almond 
attributes civic culture as the prescription to democracy to this blending of apparent 
contradictions by Eckstein (Almond, 2002: 198). 
Inglehart, who reignited the study of political culture in the 1980s, reinterprets civic 
culture as “a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, 
interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order” (1988: 1203) and finds that a 
high level of civic culture was strongly correlated with economic development as well as 
with stable democratic institutions (1988 and 1990). Armed with comprehensive evidence 
measured at multiple waves from the World Values Survey (WVS), Inglehart made a stronger 
* This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National 
Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2015S1A3A2046562).
1 Almond (1980) traced the origin of the idea of civic culture to Aristotle’s conception of mixed 
government that is organized on both oligarchic and democratic principles with a predominant 
middle class.
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case for confirming the congruence theory. 
Putnam has distinguished himself by focusing on conditions not only for stable 
democracy but also for good or successful one, that is, “strong, responsive, effective 
representative institutions” (1993: 6). Putnam’s approach is also ingenious in that he focused 
on cultural variations within a single country – in one study, Italy (1993) and in the other, the 
United States (2000). His answers, however, are not something completely new: culture, civic 
culture in particular, matters. Based on a multi-method, comparative study of Italy’s regional 
governments, Putnam demonstrates that the stock of social capital, defined as “features 
of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency 
of society by facilitating coordinated actions,” (1993: 67) is positively correlated with the 
performance of regional and local governments. He is not the one who first used or defined 
social capital but most scholars agreed that he made the term and its implications for such 
issues as collective action, economic development, and democratic governance especially 
salient (Woolcock, 2010). Putnam (2001) replicates this finding utilizing the extensive 
data about the performance of state governments of the United States and reaches similar 
conclusions. In other words, the states with high stock of social capital tend to perform better 
in such areas as education, child welfare, economy, health, crime rate, and so on. He basically 
advocates social capital as “an all-purpose elixir for the ills of society” (Uslaner and Dekker, 
2001: 176).
Utilizing the five waves of the World Values Survey spanning from 1981 to 2008, Dalton 
and Welzel (2014) propose a revised version of civic culture that would enable stable 
democracy and good governance in particular. They conclude that the assertive culture is 
beneficial for accountable governance while the allegiant culture is conducive to effective 
governance and “the allegiance-assertion combination, then, would be the best of all worlds, 
and could be seen as the “healthy mixture” that shapes Almond and Verba’s civic culture” 
(304). According to these authors, allegiant orientation consists of institutional confidence, 
philanthropic faith, and norm compliance, whereas assertive one consists of individual 
liberties, equal opportunities, and people’s voice.2
In summary, the components of civic culture or social capital such as interpersonal trust, 
trust in government, and civic engagement have been suggested with empirical evidence as 
the factors of political culture that are conducive to stable democracy and good or effective 
and accountable governance.
2. EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA
What about the evidence from East Asia, which can be dichotomized into Confucian 
countries of Taiwan, mainland China and Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam 
and non-Confucian ones of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, and Thailand? It seems that the evidence from this region does not support the 
conclusions from civic culture literature or does so partially at best. 
Park (2011), for example, concludes, based on the analysis of the second wave (2005-
2 Dalton and Welzel rightly distinguishes culture, which is a collective property, from orientation, 
which is an individual attribute. In other words, culture represents the aggregate configuration of 
all individual orientations and to measure its strength we need aggregate measures showing how 
prevalent certain orientations are in each society (292-293).
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2007) of selected countries from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), that “there may be no 
essential connection between the density of social networks and the quality of democratic 
citizenship across Southeast Asia” that includes Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Vietnam. He, however, recognizes the role of associations as schools of 
democracy in this region and suggests that they may have benefited democracy not by 
cultivating civic norms and democratic orientations but by mobilizing political activity and 
nurturing politically active citizens. Shin (2012) also finds, utilizing the same ABS dataset 
but focusing on Confucian countries, that there is no clear pattern of relationship between 
levels of attachment to Confucian group life and associational activism while there is a clear 
positive relationship between attachments to the norms of Confucian communal life and 
the bonding type of activism, which has been suggested to prevent fostering of generalized 
trust. In addition, he presents that in all four developed Confucian countries – Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore – only about one-third agreed with the statement that most people in 
their country were trustworthy while about 60% did so in the two less developed, communist 
Confucian countries, China and Vietnam. Moreover, it is interesting to note that in all three 
democracies of Confucian heritage, only a minority trusts government officials while large 
majorities in non-democracies of the same heritage such as Singapore and Vietnam trust these 
officials, the divergence of which was not discovered in non-Confucian Asia. In a sense, only 
democracies in Confucian Asia seem to produce critical or assertive citizens, the reason of 
which Shin was not able to determine with the data at hand.
Park and Shin (2005) present similar findings although they take advantage of only 
Korean data of the ABS first wave, collected in 2003. In Korea, associational membership has 
no role in promoting support for democratic principles and institutions, only to lead to more 
political activism. But it is found that social trust enhances support for democracy, which is 
consistent with the evidence from civic culture and social capital literature. In other words, 
they conclude that social involvement or structural component of social capital contributes to 
democratic citizenship behaviorally while social trust or cultural component of social capital 
contributes to it attitudinally, the finding of which Park (2011) extends with Southeast Asian 
data, as stated above.
Drawing on these works of civic culture or social capital studies and based on the latest 
fourth wave data of ABS of thirteen East Asian countries including Hong Kong, this paper 
will explore the implications of social capital at the individual level for a series of individual 
level variables that have been shown to enhance the performance of democratic political 
system such as interpersonal or generalized trust, political trust, political engagement, and 
satisfaction with democracy, while accounting for the aggregate level variables such as 
cultural frames of individualism and Confucianism. In other words, it will examine the 
effects of the major cultural frame at the country level and social capital at the individual 
level on the components of democratic citizenship. Before embarking on empirical analysis, 
a brief introduction of multilevel modeling and the ABS data is in order.
3. WHY WE NEED MULTILEVEL MODELING3
There are two methodological reasons why multilevel analysis is most appropriate for 
the empirical analysis of comparative political behavior data: first, the problem of dependent 
3 This chapter draws on Yoon (2010).
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observations within the same cultural context necessitates multilevel modeling (MLM). It 
is reasonable to assume that political values, attitudes, and behavior of the individuals in 
the same country are more homogenous than others in different countries as they are raised 
under the same educational system and share the same historical experiences (Oyserman 
and Uskul, 2008). In other words, the individuals within the same country are not truly 
independent. Kreft and Leeuw supports this observation: “the more individuals share 
common experiences due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are similar, or 
to a certain extent, duplications of each other” (1998: 9). The fact that the observations 
are not independent entails serious statistical consequences. It violates the assumption that 
the errors are independent, which underlies the standard linear models such as analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Thus, it will deflate 
the estimated standard errors and hence produce spuriously significant results, i.e., commit 
Type I errors if we pooled all the observations ignoring the dependence among them and 
apply the linear models. In fact, it has been shown that a slight ICC (Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient), a measure of the degree of dependence of individuals can dramatically increase 
the Type I error, especially when the number of observations per contextual unit is large 
(Kreft and Leeuw, 1998; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Bickel, 2007). Considering the fact 
that the minimum number of the observations per country in this analysis is greater than 
1,000 (Singapore, N=1,039), the concern about Type I error is particularly valid.4 In sum, 
MLM is appropriate for this study because it attempts to explain individual level variation 
with the higher level factors as well as the same level factors, taking into account the fact that 
individual level observations are dependent or share variation.  
Second, the empirical analysis of this paper is a response to increasing calls for taking 
advantage of contextual information in comparative political behavior as well as in the 
psychological study of culture (Hofstede, 2001; Curtice, 2007; Oyserman and Uskul, 2008). 
The typical dataset in comparative political behavior is structured hierarchically. That is, the 
individual level data (Level 1) are collected and organized according to a country (Level 2) 
as in ABS as well as in WVS. However, the empirical study of comparative political behavior 
have under-utilized the information from this unique data structure. Most comparative 
political behavior studies have done a separate analysis per each country or compared 
samples from only two to three countries or analyzed pooled samples from multiple countries 
without taking advantage of contextual information. In other words, previous research in 
comparative political behavior has rarely taken advantage of the contextual information, the 
incorporation of which into a multilevel model is likely to reduce model misspecification 
compared with a single level model (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 219). In addition, MLM 
takes into account not only the uniqueness of each context but also what they have in 
common by incorporating contextual information, what Kreft and Leeuw (1998) would call 
“borrowing strength.”
In sum, multilevel analysis is superior to traditional alternative methods that address the 
issue of dependent observations within contexts. For example, either we could run a single 
analysis based on pooled observations without correcting for dependent observations at the 
lower level or do a separate analysis per each country and compare the results. However, the 
former will be likely to entail spuriously significant results while the latter will discard the 
information at the contextual level, i.e., the country level in this paper. Moreover, the need 
4 According to Kreft and Leeuw (1998: 10), a small ICC (say p=0.01) inflates the Type I error rate 
from the assumed 0.05 to an observed 0.17 for groups of mere 100 observations.
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for separate analyses for separate contexts contradicts the premise that countries are related 
to each other (Kreft and Leeuw, 1998).
4. THE ASIAN BAROMETER SURVEY
The empirical analysis of this paper primarily relies on the newest fourth wave of the ABS 
data of thirteen East Asian countries and territories. For the past fifteen years, the ABS project 
has collected empirical data on issues such as political values, democratic legitimacy, political 
participation, and the quality of democratic governance in Asian countries and provided 
students of comparative political behavior with rich opportunities to examine the current 
status and the changing nature of the quality of democratic governance from the perspectives 
of ordinary citizens in this dynamic region. The first wave of the ABS was conducted from 
2001 to 2003 for eight East Asian countries and each wave has since been administered in 
approximately every four years. The second wave was conducted in 2005–2008 for twelve 
East Asian countries and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
and Nepal) and the third wave in 2010–2012 for twelve East Asian countries. All ABS 
surveys are conducted in face-to-face interviews, using national probability samples of voting 
age population in each countries surveyed (http://www.asianbarometer.org). Table 1 shows 
the number of respondents per country and wave although this paper analyzes only the fourth 
wave data.








Japan 1,418 1,067 1,880 1,081 5,446 
Hong Kong 811 849 1,207 1,217 4,084 
Korea 1,500 1,212 1,207 1,200 5,119 
China 3,183 5,098 3,473 4,068 15,822 
Mongolia 1,144 1,211 1,210 1,228 4,793 
Philippines 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 4,800 
Taiwan 1,415 1,587 1,592 1,657 6,251 
Thailand 1,546 1,546 1,512 1,200 5,804 
Indonesia 1,598 1,550 1,550 4,698 
Singapore 1,012 1,000 1,039 3,051 
Vietnam 1,200 1,191 1,200 3,591 
Cambodia 1,000 1,200 1,200 3,400 
Malaysia 1,218 1,214 1,207 3,639 
Myanmar 1,620 1,620 
Total 12,217 19,798 19,436 20,667 72,118
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5. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EAST ASIA
At the conceptual core, social capital consists of networks or associations and generalized 
trust, which constitute its structural and cultural components, respectively (Park and Shin, 
2005).5 And social capital literature has suggested that the connection is stronger from 
networks or more broadly civic engagement to interpersonal trust, rather than the reverse 
(Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Fung, 2003; Park and Shin, 2005; Paxton, 2007). According to the 
neo-Tocquevillian perspective, participation in voluntary associations enables citizens to 
obtain the civic skills necessary for participation in a broader and more varied social network 
and makes them more pro-social and trusting through a socialization mechanism (Van Der 
Meer et al., 2009a; Van Der Meer et al., 2009b). Thus, I expect that the more formal groups 
one joins, the greater trust one will have in strangers although we recognize the fact that prior 
research on the sources of interpersonal or social trust using East Asian data has produced no 
definitive answer, as was discussed above (Park and Shin, 2005; Park, 2011; Shin, 2012). 
In addition, in line with previous literature on social capital, I expect that civic 
engagement, measured by the number of formal group one belongs to, and generalized trust, 
will lead to more political trust, political engagement, more political efficacy, and more 
satisfaction with democracy. Citizens who participate in voluntary associations are more 
likely to be politically active since they have acquired the civic skills, the social network 
and the civic mindedness to be so (Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba et al., 1995; Van Der 
Meer et al., 2009a). In other words, citizens with higher levels of social capital are likely 
to trust government officials, to be interested in politics, to follow news about politics and 
government more often, and to discuss political matters with family members and friends 
more often. Moreover, citizens with higher levels of generalized trust and formal group 
membership are more likely to feel that they can understand political matters and that they 
can influence what the government does. Finally, social capital as individual attributes 
increases one’s satisfaction with democracy. 
At the country level, I expect that collectivistic culture, marked by ingroup favoritism, 
will lower generalized trust while individualistic culture, the opposite pole to collectivism on 
cultural dimension, will increase generalized trust. Based on a series of experimental studies 
using the US and Japanese samples, Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) and Yamagishi and 
his colleagues (1998) propose the “emancipation theory of trust” that emphasizes the role of 
generalized trust or “belief in the benevolence of human nature in general” in emancipating 
people from the confines of safe, but closed relationships, which characterize collectivistic 
culture. Gheorghiu and his colleagues (2009) extend and confirm the theory based on the 
multilevel analysis of European Social Survey data from 31 European countries. They find 
that individualism, measured by Hofstede (2001), has a significant and positive relationship 
with generalized social trust over and above the effect of a country’s political history of 
communism and ethnic heterogeneity. Yoon’s multilevel analysis (2010) also reaches the 
same conclusion using the OECD country data from the WVS. Van Hoorn’s recent multilevel 
analysis (2015) finds that individualism is associated with a broader trust radius while 
collectivism is associated with a narrower trust radius and concludes that trust radius, that 
5 Social capital is another “essentially contest term” in company with such concepts as culture, power, 
and the rule of law (Woolcock, 2010). The debate on conceptual refinement, measurement strategy, 
and unit of analysis, for the term deserve a separate forum for research. 
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is, the width of the circle of people among whom a certain trust level exists, might be an 
inherent part of the individualism-collectivism cultural syndrome. 
Furthermore, we expect that Confucianism as cultural frame affect trust in others 
negatively, which is consistent with Fukuyama’s argument based on the legacies of familism 
in Confucian culture (1995). Familism has also been suggested as a form of collectivism and 
found to be negatively correlated with social capital (Realo et al., 2008). Brewer and Venaik 
(2011) suggest that GLOBE’s in-group collectivism, another empirically driven concept for 
collectivism be relabeled “family collectivism” while Hofstede’s collectivism as “work-
orientation.” And Delhey et al. (2011) conclude that the trust radius is substantially narrower 
in Confucian countries but wider in wealthy countries, which necessitates a control for the 
wealth of a country.
6. THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES
Based on the discussion above on social capital and democratic citizenship in general and 
its application to East Asian countries, a series of theoretical hypotheses are formulated as 
follows:
6.1. Civic Engagement and Generalized Trust
H1: Civic engagement increases generalized trust. The culture of individualism increases 
generalized trust while Confucianism decreases it.
6.2. Social Capital and Political Trust
H2: Social capital increases political trust. The culture of individualism increases political 
trust while Confucianism decreases it.
6.3. Social Capital and Political Engagement
H3-1: Social capital increases political interest. The culture of individualism increases 
political interest while Confucianism decreases it.
H3-2: Social capital increases political news consumption. The culture of individualism 
increases political news consumption while Confucianism decreases it.
H3-3: Social capital increases political discussion. The culture of individualism increases 
political discussion while Confucianism decreases it.
6.4. Social Capital and Political Efficacy
H4-1: Social capital increases internal efficacy. The culture of individualism increases 
internal efficacy while Confucianism decreases it.
H4-2: Social capital increases external efficacy. The culture of individualism increases 
external efficacy while Confucianism decreases it.
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6.5. Social Capital and Satisfaction with Democracy
H5: Social capital increases satisfaction with democracy. The culture of individualism 
increases satisfaction with democracy while Confucianism decreases it.
7. MULTILEVEL MODELS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
To empirically test a series of hypotheses laid out above, I construct multilevel models as 
follows6:
7.1. Level 1: Individual
Generalized Trust/ Political Trust/ Political Engagement/ Political Efficacy/ Satisfaction 
with Democracy 
= B0 + B1 Female + B2 Age + B3 Education + B4 Income+ B5 Social Capital + rij
Level 2: Country
B0 =  G00 + G01 Individualism + G02 Confucianism + G03 Population + G04 
Industrialization + G05 Democracy + u0j
7.2. Mixed Model
Generalized Trust/ Political Trust/ Political Engagement/ Political Efficacy/ Satisfaction 
with Democracy 
= G00 + B1 Female + B2 Age + B3 Education + B4 Income+ B5 Social Capital +
   G01 Individualism + G02 Confucianism + G03 Population + G04 Industrialization + 
   G05 Democracy + rij + u0j
A mixed model with random intercept is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models. 
B represents the fixed effect at the individual level except for the intercept (B0) which is 
random, that is, it varies over countries. Gst is the effect of the macro variable t (i.e., macro-
level intercept, Individualism, Confucianism, Population, Industrialization and Democracy) 
on the regression coefficient of micro variable s (i.e., micro-level intercept). It represents the 
fixed effect at the country level. r refers to level 1 error and u level 2 error. The subscript i 
indexes respondent and j country. 
Each mixed model has generalized trust (Table 2 and 3), political trust (Table 4), political 
engagement (Table 5, 6 and 7), political efficacy (Table 8 and 9), and satisfaction with 
democracy (Table 10) as the dependent variable. Except for the models with generalized trust 
as the dependent variable, social capital, the independent variable at the individual level, 
consists of generalized trust and membership. Social capital refers to only civic engagement 
or formal group membership in the models with generalized trust as the dependent variable. 
Individualism and Confucianism are accounted for, in turn, to compare the independent 
effects of each cultural level variable. Every model accounts for gender, age, education, and 
income as controls at the individual level while each model includes, in turn, population, 
6 All the variables and their measures used in the analysis are described in the Appendix. Descriptive 
statistics for all the variables are available from the author upon request.
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industrialization, and democracy as controls at the country level in order to explore what 
constitute proper contextual effects in these multilevel models. Specifically, in every analysis, 
Model 2 only accounts for individualism and Model 3 add population size as the only control. 
Model 4 includes both individualism and Confucianism as the country level independent 
variables and population size as the only control. Model 5 adds the level of industrialization 
to Model 4 and finally, Model 6 add the level of democracy to Model 5, which makes Model 
6 the full model.
The analysis used Stata software and the maximum likelihood (ML) method to estimate 
parameters. Generalized trust in Table 2 is the only binary variable and the estimation 
is based on multilevel mixed-effect probit regression analysis and the other models are 
estimated based on multilevel mixed effect ordered probit regression analysis considering the 
ordinal measures of 4-scale generalized trust, political trust, political engagement, political 
efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy. All continuous variables at the individual level 
are group-mean or country-mean centered and those at the country level are grand-mean 
centered in line with recent development in the multilevel literature (Enders and Tofighi, 
2007; Sumino, 2014).
8. RESULTS
First of all, the analysis seems to confirm the validity of multilevel modeling as the 
between-country variance for the dependent variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level throughout all the empty models in which no independent variables are included (Model 
1 in every table from Table 2 to Table 10). In addition, all variance components except for 
Model 4-5 in Table 3 and in Table 6 and Model 6 in all the Tables are statistically significant. 
This suggests that individuals within a particular country are more homogenous than ones 
in other countries and affected by different initial conditions. In other words, there exist 
contextual effects that need to be properly accounted for. Yet, as models with more country 
level variables tend to make the estimate statistically not significant, it is worthy of further 
research as to whether variations in social and political trust and other political engagement 
attitudes of citizens in East Asia could be explained in a single fixed model with theoretically 
driven contextual variables.
8.1. Civic Engagement and Generalized Trust
As for the individual level implications of social capital for democracy in East Asia, the 
empirical analysis produced a series of mixed results. First, it seems that civic engagement, 
measured by the number of formal group one belongs to, in fact, does not increase trust 
in strangers but dampens it. According to the results shown in Table 2, all the coefficient 
estimates of membership variable are negative and statistically significant, which rejects 
H1. This hypothesis is again falsified when generalized trust is measured on a Likert scale. 
As the results in Table 3 show, the coefficient estimates for the formal group membership 
are negative in Model 2 and 3 and they are statistically significant in Model 3. Although 
the coefficients are positive in Model 4 to 6, which is consistent with expectation, they are 
not statistically significant. Moreover, individualism negatively affects generalized trust in 
all models of Table 2 and 3 while Confucianism affects it positively in most models in the 
same tables. All the coefficient estimates for these country level variables are in the opposite 
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direction to H1 and largely statistically significant except for that of Confucianism of Model 
4 in Table 2 and that of individualism of the same model in Table 3. In general, the results 
suggest that civic engagement does not increase generalized trust independently at the 
individual level and that neither individualism nor collectivism at the country level does so 
as, in East Asia. In other worlds, H1 is not supported by the empirical evidence.  
8.2. Social Capital and Political Trust
In general, social trust and formal group membership, cultural and structural components 
of social capital, respectively, appear to enhance political trust or trust in government officials 
Table 2. Membership and Generalized Trust
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independently, as expected. According to Table 4, all the coefficients for trust in Model 2-6 
are positive and statistically significant and so are those for membership in Model 3, 5, and 
6. The coefficient estimates for membership are positive as expected but not statistically 
significant in Model 2 and 4. In addition, all the coefficients for individualism are positive 
and statistically significant except for Model 6 and all the coefficients for collectivism are 
negative but only that of Model 6 is statistically significant. In sum, generalized trust leads 
to political trust and membership in formal group largely do the same, the results of which 
Table 3. Membership and Generalized Trust (4-scale)
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support H2 at the individual level. Individualism leads to trust in government officials while 
collectivism decreases political trust especially when controlling for population, wealth, and 
the level of democracy. The results largely support H2 at the country level. 
Table 4. Social Capital and Political Trust
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8.3. Social Capital and Political Engagement
Generalized trust seems to increase political engagement when measured with political 
interest, political news consumption, and political discussion while formal group membership 
does not. According to Table 5, 6 and 7, the coefficient estimates for social trust are 
consistently positive and statistically significant in all models. The coefficient estimates for 
the number of formal groups one belongs to, however, are in the opposite direction to H3-
1, H3-2, and H3-3. Furthermore, this structural component of social capital has statistically 
significant negative effects on political interest in Model 6 (Table 5), on political news 
consumption in all the models except for Model 1 (Table 6), and on political discussion in 
Model 6 (Table 7), the results of which are largely consistent with the unexpected ones of 
formal group membership on generalized trust in Table 1.
As for the contextual effects on political engagement, only on political news consumption 
individualism consistently has positive effects while Confucianism consistently has negative 
effects, supporting H3-2. In the other areas of political engagement, these country level 
variables do not exert a consistent influence. For example, individualism increases interest 
in politics but decreases it when controlling for population, industrialization and democracy. 
Individualism leads to political discussion only when the other country level variables are 
not accounted for. It even decreases political discussion when they all are controlled. On 
the other hand, Confucianism is in the expected direction when it comes to political interest 
and political discussion as in political news consumption but the coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant only in the full models of political interest and political discussion. 
In sum, the evidence supports H3 across all the aspects of political engagement at the 
individual level when it comes to generalized trust or cultural component of social capital 
but fails to do so as regards to formal group membership or structural component of social 
capital. The evidence also supports the hypothesis that individualism increases political 
engagement while Confucianism dampens it only when it is operationalized with political 
news consumption (H3-2). In the other aspects of political engagement such as political 
interest and political discussion, these country level variables fail to produce consistent 
results as H3-1 and H3-2 expected.
8.4. Social Capital and Political Efficacy
Social trust seems to enhance political efficacy consistently, be it internal or external, 
while formal group appear membership does so to a lesser degree. The more trust one 
has in others, the more likely he or she would disagree that a person like him or her can’t 
really understand politics (Table 8) and government and that he or she have any influence 
over what the government does (Table 9). All the coefficients for social trust are positive 
and statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient estimates for formal group 
membership is positive and statistically significant only in Model 6 for internal efficacy and 
Model 2, 3, and 6 for external efficacy.
The country level variables such as individualism and Confucianism do not appear to 
have consistent effects on internal and external political efficacy. For example, individualism 
does not have statistically significant effects on internal efficacy in general but does so in the 
opposite direction to H4 (Table 8). Confucianism has statistically significant and negative 
effects on internal efficacy as shown in Model 6 of Table 8 and on external efficacy in Model 
5 and 6 of Table 9, the results of which confirm H4. Yet it fails to reach statistical significance 
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in Model 4 for external efficacy or shows even positive, statistically significant effects in 
Model 4 and 5 for internal efficacy.
In sum, social capital largely enhances internal and external political efficacy, which 
confirms H4 at the individual level. Individualism fails to support H4 while Confucianism 
Table 5. Social Capital and Political Interest
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Table 6. Social Capital and Political News Consumption
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partially confirms H4 at the country level.
8.5. Social Capital and Satisfaction with Democracy
Finally, generalized trust seems to lead to satisfaction with democracy while formal group 
Table 7. Social Capital and Political Discussion
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membership does not appear so. According to the results shown in Table 10, trust in others 
exerts consistently statistically significant, positive effects on satisfaction with democracy. 
In contrast, the coefficient estimates for membership are positive except for Model 2 but all 
Table 8. Social Capital and Internal Efficacy
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fail to reach a statistical significance in all the models. As for the country level variables, the 
coefficient estimate for individualism is positive and statistically significant only in Model 5 
and the estimate for Confucianism is negative and statistically significant only in Model 6.
In summary, the cultural component of social capital leads to one’s satisfaction with the 
Table 9. Social Capital and External Efficacy
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way democracy work in his or her country while its structural component does not necessary 
so, which means that the results support H5 at the attitudinal level but not at the behavioral 
level. In addition, H5 at the country level is confirmed only partially for both individualism 
and Confucianism. 
Table 10. Social Capital and Satisfaction with Democracy
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9. DISCUSSION
This study has tested a series of theoretical hypotheses about the individual level 
implications of social capital for democracy while accounting for contextual effects in 14 
countries of East Asia using the newest fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey. The 
empirical analysis based on multilevel modeling produced a series of mixed results at the 
individual level as well as at the country level. In line with the previous research on the 
implication of social capital for democracy, generalized trust or the cultural component of 
social capital independently enhances political trust, political engagement such as political 
interest, political news consumption, and political discussion, internal and external political 
efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy. However, associational involvement or the 
structural component of social capital fail to show positive effects on the same dependent 
variables that have been suggested as beneficial for stable, democratic governance. In East 
Asia, on the country, formal group membership seems to have negative effects on social trust 
and political engagement. Although it appears to have some positive effects on political trust 
and political efficacy, it fails to show statistically significant positive effects on satisfaction 
with democracy.
As for the country level variables, individualism and Confucianism do not seem to exert 
consistent, expected, influences on the same dependent variables. Largely in line with the 
previous research on political culture, individualism leads to political trust, political news 
consumption as a proxy for political engagement, satisfaction with democracy without 
controlling for the level of democracy while Confucianism, presumably related to is familism 
and collectivism, decreases political trust, political news consumption, and satisfaction with 
democracy with all the contextual level controls. Yet individualism, again unexpectedly, 
appear to affect generalized trust negatively while Confucianism affects it positively in 
general
Where do these inconsistent results of the empirical analysis leave us? First of all, the 
analysis confirms that generalized, social trust matters for stable, democratic governance, 
which is in line with the previous research on social capital. But the analysis does not tell 
us where it comes from. The citizens in East Asia do not seem to socialize themselves in 
associations to learn and enhance trust in others. Is this phenomenon, which is contrary to the 
neo-Tocquevillian perspective, specific to the citizens in East Asia? 
That may not be the case. Directly opposed to those who argue that formal, bridging 
group membership would enhance democratic citizenship, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) 
observe that joining a voluntary association does not provide adequate foundation for good 
citizenship. People tend to join homogeneous groups, not heterogeneous ones. Involvement 
in voluntary associational life or civic participation does not lead to political participation. It 
may even turn people away from political participation. Moreover, they argue that voluntary 
associations of homogeneous members, do not teach that democracy is messy, inefficient, and 
conflict-ridden, the realities of which good citizens need to learn. The results of this paper as 
well as in previous literature that analyzed the ABS data (Park and Shin, 2005; Park, 2011, 
among others) seem to confirm Theiss-Morse and Hibbing’s observation. Whether these 
results are specific to this region or can be generalized to other parts of the world is worthy 
of further research. If it turns out these results are only specific to East Asian countries in 
general or Confucian countries in particular, we need to delve further into the causal dynamic 
as to whether citizens in this region tend to transform formal groups including the ones of 
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“bridging” nature into “bonding” groups or whether most formal groups in the region are 
inherently of bonding nature regardless of outward appearances.
Moreover, seemingly negative effect of individualism as cultural syndrome on 
generalized trust, which is directly contrary to previous research that largely draws on the 
evidence from advanced democracies, and its inconsistent effects across the other areas 
of investigation, need further elaboration. It may have to do with methodological issues 
including measurement and model specification or with the fact that each model has a 
different substantive rationale. For example, the narrower radius of trust of collectivism 
would enhance generalized trust as “most people” in generalized trust may only refer to 
ingroup members. Largely positive and statistically significant effects of Confucianism on 
generalized trust appear to support this line of reasoning.
APPENDIX: VARIABLES AND MEASURES
Dependent variable
1. Generalized Trust
     Q23 General speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you must be very 
careful?
     Q25 General speaking, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that “most people are trustworthy”?
2. Political Trust
     Q129 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? You can generally trust the 
people who run our government to do what is right?
3. Political Engagement
     Q44 How interested would you say you are in politics?
     Q45 How often do you follow news about politics and government?
     Q47 When you get together with your family members or friends, how often do you 
discuss political matters?
4. Political Efficacy
     Q127 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Sometimes politics and 
government seems so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what is 
going on.
     Q128 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? People like me don’t have 
any influence over what the government does.
5. Satisfaction with Democracy
     Q84 On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
[country]?
Independent Variable at the Individual Level
1. Membership
     Additive measure on a scale of 0 to 3 using Q20-Q22 Which organization or formal group 
you belong to?
2. Trust
     Q23 General speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you must be very 
careful?
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Independent Variable at the Country Level
1.  Individualism: Hofstede IDV measure from the data “Six dimensions for website.xls,” 
retrieved from http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix on July 10, 2016
2.  Confucian: dummy variable for six historically Confucian countries that include Taiwan, 
Korea, Japan, mainland China and Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Control Variable at the Individual Level
1. Female (SE1)
2. Age (SE2)
3. Education (SE4A): years of formal education
4. Income (SE11): monthly household income on a quintile scale
Control Variable at the Country Level
1.  Population: common logged population in thousands as of 2003 from the data “Democracy_
TimeSeries_Data_January2009_StataSE.dta,” retrieved from https://www.hks.harvard.edu/
fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm on July 10, 2016
2.  Industrialization: Energy use in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita as of 2013 retrieved 
from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE. The Taiwanese value is 
from the “Engergy.xls” retrieved from http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/content/
ContentLink.aspx?menu_id=1540 on July 10, 2016
3.  Democracy: Polity IV score as of 2014 from the data “p4v2015d.xls” retrieved from http://
www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html on July 10, 2016
Article Received: 5-28-2017  Revised: 6-25-2017  Accepted: 6-25-2017
REFERENCES
Almond, Gabriel A. 1980. “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept.” In The 
Civic Culture Revisited: an Analytic Study, ed. G. A. Almond and S. Verba. Boston: 
Little, Brown.
   . 2002. Ventures in Political Science: Narratives and Reflections. Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner.
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. 1997. “Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and 
Consequences of Social Capital.” American Journal of Political Science 41(3):999-
1023.
Brewer, Paul, and Sunil Venaik. 2011. “Individualism–Collectivism in Hofstede and 
GLOBE.” Journal of International Business Studies 42(3):436-45.
Curtice, John. 2007. “Comparative Opinion Surveys.” In Oxford Handbook of Political 
Behavior, ed. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Dalton, Russell J., and Christian Welzel. 2014. The Civic Culture Transformed: from 
Allegiant To Assertive Citizens. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Delhey, Jan, Kenneth Newton, and Christian Welzel. 2011. “How General Is Trust in “Most 
People”? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem.” American Sociological Review 76 
THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR DEMOCRACY  83
IN EAST ASIA
(5):786-807.
Eckstein, Harry. 1969. “Authority Relations and Governmental Performance: A Theoretical 
Framework.” Comparative Political Studies 2(3):269-325.
Enders, Craig K., and Davood Tofighi. 2007. “Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional 
multilevel models: A new look at an old issue.” Psychological Methods 12(2):121-38.
Foley, Michael W. and Edwards, Bob. 1996. “The Paradox of Civil Society.” Journal of 
Democracy 7(3):38-52.
Fung, Archon. 2003. “Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and 
Realities.” Annual Review of Sociology 29:515-39.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New 
York: Free Press.
Gheorghiu, Mirona A., Vivian L. Vignoles, and Peter B. Smith. 2009. “Beyond the United 
States and Japan: Testing Yamagishi’s Emancipation Theory of Trust across 31 
Nations.” Social Psychology Quarterly 72(4):365-83.
Hofstede, Geert H. 2001. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1985. “Aggregate Stability and Individual-Level Flux in Mass Belief 
Systems: The Level of Analysis Paradox.” The American Political Science Review 79 
(1):97-116.
   . 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” The American Political Science 
Review 82(4):1203-30.
   . 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.
Javidan, Mansour, J. Robert House, W. Peter Dorfman, J. Paul Hanges, and Mary Sully de 
Luque. 2006. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Cultures and Their Consequences: 
A Comparative Review of GLOBE’s and Hofstede’s Approaches.” Journal of 
International Business Studies 37(6):897-914.
Kreft, Ita, and Jan de Leeuw. 1998. Introducing Multilevel Modeling. London; Thousand 
Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Park, Chong-Min. 2011. “Associations and Social Networks in Southeast Asia: Schools 
of Democracy?” In The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia, ed. 
Croissant, Aurel, and Marco Bünte. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Park, Chong-Min, and Doh Chull Shin. 2005. “Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship: 
The Case of South Korea.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 6(01):63-85.
Paxton, Pamela. 1999. “Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator 
Assessment.” American Journal of Sociology 105(1):88-127.
   . 2007. “Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model Across 
31 Countries.” Social Forces 86:47-76.
Oyserman, Daphna, and Ayse K. Uskul. 2008. “Individualism and Collectivism: Societal-
Level Processes with Implications for Individual-Level and Society-Level Outcomes.” 
In Multilevel Analysis of Individuals and Cultures, ed. F. J. R. v. d. Vijver, D. A. v. 
Hemert and Y. H. Poortinga. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
New York: Simon & Schuster.
Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: 
84 KWANG-IL YOON
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Realo, Anu, Juri Allik, and Brenna Greenfield. 2008. “Radius of Trust: Social Capital in 
Relation to Familism and Institutional Collectivism.” Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology 39:447-62.
Shin, Doh Chull. 2012. Confucianism and democratization in East Asia. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Steenbergen, Marco R., and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. “Modeling Multilevel Data Structures.” 
American Journal of Political Science 46(1):218-37.
Sumino, Takanori. 2014. “Does Immigration Erode the Multicultural Welfare State? A Cross-
National Multilevel Analysis in 19 OECD Member States.” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 40(3):436-55.
Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. “Citizenship and Civic Engagement.” 
Annual Review of Political Science 8(1):227-49.
Uslaner, Eric M., and Paul Dekker. 2001. “The ‘Social’ in Social Capital.” In Paul Dekker 
and Eric M. Uslaner. eds, Social capital and Participation in Everyday Life. London: 
Routledge.
Van Der Meer, Tom W. G., and Eric. J. Van Ingen. 2009a. “Schools of Democracy? 
Disentangling the Relationship Between Civic Participation and Political Action in 17 
European Countries.” European Journal of Political Research 48(2):281-308.
Van Der Meer, Tom W. G., Manfred te Grotenhuis, and Peer L. H. Scheepers. 2009b. “Three 
Types of Voluntary Associations in Comparative Perspective: The Importance of 
Studying Associational Involvement through a Typology of Associations in 21 
European Countries.” Journal of Civil Society 5(3):227-241.
Van Hoorn, Andre. 2015. “Individualist-Collectivist Culture and Trust Radius: a Multilevel 
Approach.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 46:269-276.
Verba, Sidney, Schlozman, Kay L. and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Woolcock, Michael. 2010. “The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988–2008.” 
Annual Review of Political Science 13(1):469-87.
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Midori Yamagishi. 1994. “Trust and Commitment in the United 
States and Japan.” Motivation and Emotion 18(2):129-66.
Yamagishi, Toshio, Karen S. Cook, and Motoki Watabe. 1998. “Uncertainty, Trust, and 
Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan.” American Journal of 
Sociology 104(1):165-94.
Yoon, Kwang-Il. 2010. “Political Culture of Individualism and Collectivism.” PhD diss., 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Kwang-Il Yoon, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Sookmyung 
Women’s University, Cheongpa-ro 47-gil 100, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, 04310, Korea, Tel: +82-2-2077-7683, 
E-mail: kiyoon@sm.ac.kr
